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Abstract
Stable model semantics has become a very popular approach for the man-
agement of negation in logic programming. This approach relies mainly on
the closed world assumption to complete the available knowledge and its
formulation has its basis in the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation.
The primary goal of this work is to present an alternative and epistemic-
based characterization of stable model semantics, to the Gelfond-Lifschitz
transformation. In particular, we show that stable model semantics can
be defined entirely as an extension of the Kripke-Kleene semantics. In-
deed, we show that the closed world assumption can be seen as an addi-
tional source of ‘falsehood’ to be added cumulatively to the Kripke-Kleene
semantics. Our approach is purely algebraic and can abstract from the
particular formalism of choice as it is based on monotone operators (under
the knowledge order) over bilattices only.
1 Introduction
Stable model semantics [25, 26] is probably the most widely studied and most
commonly accepted approach adopted to give meaning to logic programs (with
negation). Informally, it consists in relying on the Closed World Assumption
(CWA) to complete the available knowledge –CWA assumes that all atoms not
entailed by a program are false, see [45], and is motivated by the fact that ex-
plicit representation of negative information in logic programs is not feasible
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since the addition of explicit negative information could overwhelm a system.
Defining default rules which allow implicit inference of negated facts from pos-
itive information encoded in a logic program has been an attractive alternative
to the explicit representation approach.
Stable model semantics defines a whole family of models of (or ‘answers
to’) a logic program and, remarkably, one of these stable models, the minimal
one according to ‘knowledge or information ordering’, is taken as the favorite
(e.g. see [12, 13, 44]) and is one-to-one related with the so-called well-founded
semantics [48, 49].
The original formulation of stable model semantics was classical, two-valued,
over the set of truth-values {f, t}. But, some programs have no stable model
under this setting. To overcome this problem, Przymusinski [42, 43, 44] ex-
tended the notion of stable model semantics to allow three-valued, or partial,
stable model semantics. Remarkably, three-valued logics has also been con-
sidered in other approaches for providing semantics to logic programs, such as
e.g. in [22, 29] where Clark’s completion is extended to three-valued logics, yield-
ing the well-known Kripke-Kleene semantics of logic programs. In three-valued
semantics, the set of truth values is {f, t,⊥}, where ⊥ stands for unknown.
Przymusinski showed that every program has at least a partial stable model and
that the well-founded model is the smallest among them, according to the knowl-
edge ordering. It is then a natural step to move from a three-valued semantics,
allowing the representation of incomplete information, to a four-valued seman-
tics, allowing the representation of inconsistency (denoted ⊤). The resulting
semantics is based on the well-known set of truth-values FOUR = {f, t,⊥,⊤},
introduced by Belnap [7] to model a kind of ‘relevance logic’ (there should be
some ‘syntactical’ connections between the antecedent and the consequent of
a logical entailment relation α |= β, –see also [2, 17, 18, 31, 32]. This pro-
cess of enlarging the set of truth-values culminated with Fitting’s progressive
work [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] on giving meaning to logic programs by relying on
bilattices [27]. Bilattices, where FOUR is the simplest non-trivial one, play
an important role in logic programming, and in knowledge representation in
general. Indeed, Arieli and Avron show [4, 5] that the use of four values is
preferable to the use of three values even for tasks that can in principle be
handled using only three values. Moreover, Fitting explains clearly [23] why
FOUR can be thought of as the ‘home’ of classical logic programming. Inter-
estingly, the algebraic work of Fitting’s fixed-point characterisation of stable
model semantics on bilattices [20, 21] has been the starting point of the work
carried out by Denecker, Marek and Truszczyn´ski [14, 15, 16], who extended
Fitting’s work to a more abstract context of fixed-points operators on lattices,
by relying on interval bilattices (these bilattices are obtained in a standard
way as a product of a lattice –see, for instance [20, 24]). Denecker, Marek
and Truszczyn´ski [14, 16] showed interesting connections between (two-valued
and four-valued) Kripke-Kleene [22], well-founded and stable model semantics,
as well as to Moore’s autoepistemic logic [40] and Reiter’s default logic [46].
Other well-established applications of bilattices and/or Kripke-Kleene, well-
founded and stable model semantics to give semantics to logic programs can
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be found in the context of reasoning under paraconsistency and uncertainty
(see, e.g. [1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41]). Technically, classical two-
valued stable models of logic programs are defined in terms of fixed-points of
the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz operator, GL(I), for a two-valued interpretation
I. This operator has been generalized to bilattices by Fitting [20], by means of
the Ψ′P(I) operator, where this time I is an interpretation over bilattices. Infor-
mally, the main principle of these operators is based on the separation of the role
of positive and negative information. That is, given a two-valued interpretation
I, GL(I) is obtained by first evaluating negative literals in a logic program P by
means of I, determining the reduct PI of P , and then, as PI is now a positive
program, to compute the minimal Herbrand model of PI by means of the usual
Van Emden-Kowalski’s immediate consequence operator TP [19, 33]. The com-
putation of Ψ′P(I) for bilattices is similar. As a consequence, this separation
avoids the natural management of classical negation (i.e. the evaluation of a
negative literal ¬A is given by the negation of the evaluation of A), which is
a major feature of the Kripke-Kleene semantics [22, 23] of logic programs with
negation.
The primary goal of this study is to show, in the quite general setting of
bilattices as space of truth-values, that this separation of positive and nega-
tive information is nor necessary nor is any program transformation required
to characterize stable model semantics epistemologically. Another motivation is
to evidence the role of CWA as a discriminating factor between the most com-
monly accepted semantics of logic programs. We show that the only difference
between Kripke-Kleene, well-founded and stable model semantics is the amount
of knowledge taken from CWA that they integrate. We view CWA, informally
as an additional source of information to be used for information completion,
or more precisely, as a carrier of falsehood, to be considered cumulatively to
Kripke-Kleene semantics. This allows us to view stable model semantics from a
different, not yet investigated perspective. Roughly speaking, in Kripke-Kleene
semantics, CWA is used to consider only those atoms that do not appear in head
of any rule as false (and that can obviously not be inferred as true), while the
well-founded and stable model semantics integrate more CWA-provided knowl-
edge. To identify this knowledge, we introduce the notion of support. This is a
generalization of the notion of greatest unfounded set [49] (which determines the
atoms that can be assumed to be false) to the bilattice context. It determines in
a principled way the amount of falsehood provided by CWA that can ”safely”
be assumed. More precisely, as we are considering a many-valued truth space, it
provides the degree of falseness that can ”safely” be assumed for each atom. We
then show how the support can be used to complete the Kripke-Kleene semantics
in order to obtain the well-founded and stable model semantics over bilattices.
In particular, we show that the well-founded semantics is the least informative
model in the set of models containing their own support, while a model is a sta-
ble model if and only if it is deductively closed under support completion, i.e. it
contains exactly the knowledge that can be inferred by activating the rules over
the support. We thus show an alternative characterisation of the stable model
semantics to the well-known, widely applied and long studied technique based
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on the separation of positive and negative information in the Gelfond-Lifschitz
transformation, by reverting to the classical interpretation of negation. While
the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation treats negation-as-failure in a special way
and unlike other connectives, our approach is an attempt to relate the semantics
of logic programs to a standard model-theoretic account of rules. We show that
logic programs can be analyzed using standard logical means such as the notion
of interpretation and information ordering, i.e. knowledge ordering. Therefore,
in principle, our approach does not depend on the presence of any specific con-
nective, such as negation-as-failure, nor on any specific rule syntax (the work
of Herre and Wagner [28], is in this direction, even if it differs slightly from
the usual stable model semantics [26] and the semantics is given in the context
of the classical, two-valued truth-space). Due to the generality and the purely
algebraic nature of our results, as just monotone operators over bilattices are
postulated, the epistemic characterisation of stable models given in this study
can also be applied in other contexts (e.g. uncertainty and/or paraconsistency in
logic programming, and nonmonotonic logics such as default and autoepistemic
logics).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In order to make the paper
self-contained, in the next section, we will provide definitions and properties of
bilattices and logic programs. Section 3 is the main part of this work, where
we present our characterisation of the stable model semantics, while Section 4
concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Lattices
A lattice is a partially ordered set 〈L,〉 such that every two element set {x, y} ⊆
L has a least upper bound, lub(x, y) (called the join of x and y), and a greatest
lower bound, glb(x, y) (called themeet of x and y). For ease, we will write x ≺ y
if x  y and x 6= y. A lattice 〈L,〉 is complete if every subset of L has both
least upper and greatest lower bounds. Consequently, a complete lattice has a
least element, ⊥, and a greatest element ⊤. For ease, throughout the paper,
given a complete lattice 〈L,〉 and a subset of elements S ⊆ L, with -least
and -greatest we will always mean glb(S) and lub(S), respectively. With
min(S) we denote the set of minimal elements in S w.r.t. , i.e. min(S) =
{x ∈ S: 6 ∃y ∈ S s.t. y ≺ x}. Note that while glb(S) is unique, |min(S)| > 1
may hold. If min(S) is a singleton {x}, for convenience we may also write
x = min(S) in place of {x} = min(S). An operator on a lattice 〈L,〉 is a
function from L to L, f :L→ L. An operator f on L is monotone, if for every
pair of elements x, y ∈ L, x  y implies f(x)  f(y), while f is antitone if x  y
implies f(y)  f(x). A fixed-point of f is an element x ∈ L such that f(x) = x.
The basic tool for studying fixed-points of operators on lattices is the well-
known Knaster-Tarski theorem [47].
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Theorem 2.1 (Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem [47]) Let f be a mono-
tone operator on a complete lattice 〈L,〉. Then f has a fixed-point, the set of
fixed-points of f is a complete lattice and, thus, f has a -least and a -greatest
fixed-point. The -least (respectively, -greatest) fixed-point can be obtained
by iterating f over ⊥ (respectively, ⊤), i.e. is the limit of the non-decreasing
(respectively, non-increasing) sequence x0, . . . , xi, xi+1, . . . , xλ, . . ., where for a
successor ordinal i ≥ 0,
x0 = ⊥,
xi+1 = f(xi)
(respectively, x0 = ⊤), while for a limit ordinal λ,
xλ = lub{xi: i < λ} (respectively, xλ = glb{xi: i < λ}) . (1)
We denote the -least and the -greatest fixed-point by lfp(f) and gfp(f),
respectively.
Throughout the paper, we will frequently define monotone operators, whose
sets of fixed-points define certain classes of models of a logic program. As a
consequence, please note that this also means that a least model always exists
for such classes. Additionally, for ease, for the monotone operators defined in
this study, we will specify the initial condition x0 and the next iteration step
xi+1 only, while Equation (1) is always considered as implicit. To prove that
a property holds for a limit ordinal of an iterated sequence, i.e. for transfinite
induction, one usually relies on a routine least upper bound (or greatest lower
bound) argument and on the Knaster-Tarski theorem. Therefore that case will
be considered only in the proof of Theorem 3.10, while the reasoning is similar
for all the other proofs and, thus, will be omitted.
2.2 Bilattices
The simplest non-trivial bilattice, called FOUR, was defined by Belnap [7]
(see also [5, 6, 27]), who introduced a logic intended to deal with incomplete
and/or inconsistent information. FOUR already illustrates many of the basic
properties of bilattices. Essentially, it extends the classical truth set {f, t} to
its power set {{f}, {t}, ∅, {f, t}}, where we can think that each set indicates
the amount of information we have in terms of truth: so, {f} stands for false,
{t} for true and, quite naturally, ∅ for lack of information or unknown, and
{f, t} for inconsistent information (for ease, we use f for {f}, t for {t}, ⊥ for
∅ and ⊤ for {f, t}). The set of truth values {f, t,⊥,⊤} has two quite intuitive
and natural ‘orthogonal’ orderings, k and t (see Figure 1), each giving to
FOUR the structure of a complete lattice. One is the so-called knowledge
ordering, denoted k, and is based on the subset relation, that is, if x ⊆ y then
y represents ‘more information’ than x (e.g. ⊥ = ∅ ⊆ {t} = t, i.e. ⊥ k t). The
other ordering is the so-called truth ordering, denoted t. Here x t y means
that x is ‘at least as false as y, and y is at least as true as x’, i.e. x∩{t} ⊆ y∩{t}
and y ∩ {f} ⊆ x ∩ {f} (e.g. ⊥ t t).
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Figure 1: The logic FOUR.
The general notion of bilattice used in this paper is defined as follows [21,
27]. A bilattice is a structure 〈B,t,k〉 where B is a non-empty set and t
and k are both partial orderings giving B the structure of a complete lattice
with a top and bottom element. Meet and join under t, denoted ∧ and ∨,
correspond to extensions of classical conjunction and disjunction. On the other
hand, meet and join under k are denoted ⊗ and ⊕. x⊗ y corresponds to the
maximal information x and y can agree on, while x ⊕ y simply combines the
information represented by x with that represented by y. Top and bottom under
t are denoted t and f, and top and bottom under k are denoted ⊤ and ⊥,
respectively. We will assume that bilattices are infinitary distributive bilattices
in which all distributive laws connecting ∧,∨,⊗ and ⊕ hold. We also assume
that every bilattice satisfies the infinitary interlacing conditions, i.e. each of the
lattice operations ∧,∨,⊗ and ⊕ is monotone w.r.t. both orderings. An example
of interlacing condition is: x t y and x′ t y′ implies x⊗ x′ t y⊗ y′. Finally,
we assume that each bilattice has a negation, i.e. an operator ¬ that reverses
the t ordering, leaves unchanged the k ordering, and verifies ¬¬x = x 1.
Below, we give some properties of bilattices that will be used in this study.
Figure 2 illustrates intuitively some of the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.2 ([20])
1. If x t y t z then x⊗ z k y and y k x⊕ z;
2. If x k y k z then x ∧ z t y and y t x ∨ z.
Lemma 2.3 If x t y then x t x⊗ y t y and x t x⊕ y t y.
Proof. Straightforward using the interlacing conditions.
Lemma 2.4
1. If x t y then f⊗ x t y;
1The dual operation to negation is conflation, i.e. an operator ∼ that reverses the k
ordering, leaves unchanged the t ordering, and ∼∼ x = x. If a bilattice has both, they
commute if ∼ ¬x = ¬ ∼ x for all x. We will not deal with conflation in this paper.
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Figure 2: Some points mentioned in Lemmas 2.2–2.7.
2. If x k y then f⊗ y t x.
Proof. If x t y then from f t x and by Lemma 2.3, f t f⊗ x t x t y. If
x k y then, from f t x, we have f⊗ y t x⊗ y = x.
Lemma 2.5 If x⊕ z t y then z k y ⊕ f.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, f t x⊕ z t y implies z k x⊕ z k y ⊕ f.
Lemma 2.6 If f⊗ y k x k f⊕ y then x t y.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, f ⊗ y k x k f ⊕ y implies x t (f ⊗ y) ∨ (f ⊕ y).
Therefore, x t (f⊗ y)⊕ ((f ⊗ y) ∨ y) and, thus, x t (f ⊗ y)⊕ y = y.
Lemma 2.7 If x k y and x t y then x⊗ f = y ⊗ f.
Proof. By Lemma 2.4, f ⊗ y t x and, thus, f ⊗ y t x ⊗ f follows. From
x t y, f⊗ x t y ⊗ f holds. Therefore, x⊗ f = y ⊗ f.
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2.2.1 Bilattice construction
Bilattices come up in natural ways. There are two general, but different, con-
struction methods, to build a bilattice from a lattice which are widely used.
We only outline them here in order to give an idea of their application (see
also [20, 27]).
The first bilattice construction method was proposed by [27]. Suppose we
have two complete distributive lattices 〈L1,1〉 and 〈L2,2〉. Think of L1 as a
lattice of values we use when we measure the degree of belief, while think of L2
as the lattice we use when we measure the degree of doubt. Now, we define the
structure L1 ⊙ L2 as follows. The structure is 〈L1 × L2,t,k〉, where
• 〈x1, x2〉 t 〈y1, y2〉 if x1 1 y1 and y2 2 x2;
• 〈x1, x2〉 k 〈y1, y2〉 if x1 1 y1 and x2 2 y2.
In L1⊙L2 the idea is: knowledge goes up if both degree of belief and degree of
doubt go up; truth goes up if the degree of belief goes up, while the degree of
doubt goes down. It can easily be verified that L1 ⊙ L2 is a bilattice. Further-
more, if L1 = L2 = L, i.e. we are measuring belief and doubt in the same way
(e.g. L = {f, t}), then negation can be defined as ¬〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉, i.e. negation
switches the roles of belief and doubt. Applications of this method can be found,
for instance, in [1, 27, 28].
The second construction method has been sketched in [27] and addressed
in more detail in [24], and is probably the more used one. Suppose we have
a complete distributive lattice of truth values 〈L,〉. Think of these values as
the ‘real’ values in which we are interested, but due to lack of knowledge we
are able just to ‘approximate’ the exact values. Rather than considering a pair
〈x, y〉 ∈ L×L as indicator for degree of belief and doubt, 〈x, y〉 is interpreted as
the set of elements z ∈ L such that x  z  y. That is, a pair 〈x, y〉 is interpreted
as an interval. An interval 〈x, y〉 may be seen as an approximation of an exact
value. For instance, in reasoning under uncertainty (see, e.g. [35, 36, 37]), L is
the unit interval [0, 1] with standard ordering, L×L is interpreted as the set of
(closed) intervals in [0, 1], and the pair 〈x, y〉 is interpreted as a lower and an
upper bound of the exact value of the certainty value. A similar interpretation is
given in [14, 15, 16], but this time L is the set of two-valued interpretations, and
a pair 〈J−
I
, J+
I
〉 ∈ L×L is interpreted as a lower and upper bound approximation
of the application of a monotone (immediate consequence) operator O:L → L
to an interpretation I.
Formally, given the lattice 〈L,〉, the bilattice of intervals is 〈L×L,t,k〉,
where:
• 〈x1, x2〉 t 〈y1, y2〉 if x1  y1 and x2  y2;
• 〈x1, x2〉 k 〈y1, y2〉 if x1  y1 and y2  x2.
The intuition of these orders is that truth increases if the interval contains
greater values, whereas the knowledge increases when the interval becomes more
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precise. Negation can be defined as ¬〈x, y〉 = 〈¬y,¬x〉, where ¬ is a negation
operator on L. Note that, if L = {f, t}, and if we assign f = 〈f, f〉, t = 〈t, t〉,
⊥ = 〈f, t〉 and ⊤ = 〈t, f〉, then we obtain a structure that is isomorphic to the
bilattice FOUR.
2.3 Logic programs, interpretations, models and program
knowledge completions
We recall here the definitions given in [20]. This setting is as general as possible,
so that the results proved in this paper will be widely applicable.
Classical logic programming has the set {f, t} as its truth space, but as
stated by Fitting [20], “FOUR can be thought as the ‘home’ of ordinary logic
programming and its natural extension is to bilattices other than FOUR: the
more general the setting the more general the results”. We will also consider
bilattices as the truth space of logic programs.
2.3.1 Logic programs
Consider an alphabet of predicate symbols, of constants, of function symbols
and variable symbols. A term, t, is either a variable x, a constant c or of the
form f(t1, . . . , tn), where f is an n-ary function symbol and all ti are terms.
An atom, A, is of the form p(t1, . . . , tn), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol
and all ti are terms. A literal, l, is of the form A or ¬A, where A is an atom.
A formula, ϕ, is an expression built up from the literals and the members of a
bilattice B using ∧,∨,⊗,⊕, ∃ and ∀. Note that members of the bilattice may
appear in a formula, e.g. in FOUR, (p∧q)⊕(r⊗f) is a formula. A rule is of the
form p(x1, . . . , xn) ← ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and
all xi are variables. The atom p(x1, . . . , xn) is called the head, and the formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is called the body. It is assumed that the free variables of the body
are among x1, . . . , xn. Free variables are thought of as universally quantified. A
logic program, denoted with P , is a finite set of rules. The Herbrand universe of
P is the set of ground (variable-free) terms that can be built from the constants
and function symbols occurring in P , while the Herbrand base of P (denoted
BP) is the set of ground atoms over the Herbrand universe.
Definition 2.8 (P∗) Given a logic program P, the associated set P∗ is con-
structed as follows;
1. put in P∗ all ground instances of members of P (over the Herbrand base);
2. if a ground atom A is not head of any rule in P∗, then add the rule A← f
to P∗. Note that it is a standard practice in logic programming to consider
such atoms as false. We incorporate this by explicitly adding A ← f to
P∗;
3. replace several ground rules in P∗ having same head, A ← ϕ1, A ← ϕ2,
. . . with A ← ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∨ . . .. As there could be infinitely many grounded
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rules with same head, we may end with a countable disjunction, but the
semantics behavior is unproblematic.
Note that in P∗, each ground atom appears in the head of exactly one rule.
2.3.2 Interpretations
Let 〈B,t,k〉 be a bilattice. By interpretation of a logic program on the
bilattice we mean a mapping I from ground atoms to members of B. An inter-
pretation I is extended from atoms to formulae as follows:
1. for b ∈ B, I(b) = b;
2. for formulae ϕ and ϕ′, I(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = I(ϕ) ∧ I(ϕ′), and similarly for ∨,⊗,⊕
and ¬; and
3. I(∃xϕ(x)) =
∨
{I(ϕ(t)): t ground term}, and similarly for universal quan-
tification 2.
The family of all interpretations is denoted by I(B). The truth and knowledge
orderings are extended from B to I(B) as follows:
• I1 t I2 iff I1(A) t I2(A), for every ground atom A; and
• I1 k I2 iff I1(A) k I2(A), for every ground atom A.
Given two interpretations I, J , we define (I ∧ J)(ϕ) = I(ϕ) ∧ J(ϕ), and simi-
larly for the other operations. With If and It we denote the bottom and top
interpretations under t (they map any atom into f and t, respectively). With
I⊥ and I⊤ we denote the bottom and top interpretations under k (they map
any atom into ⊥ and ⊤, respectively). It is easy to see that the space of inter-
pretations 〈I(B),t,k〉 is an infinitary interlaced and distributive bilattice as
well.
2.3.3 Classical setting
Note that in a classical logic program the body is a conjunction of literals.
Therefore, if A ← ϕ ∈ P∗, then ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn and ϕi = Li1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lin .
Furthermore, a classical total interpretation is an interpretation over FOUR
such that an atom is mapped into either f or t. A partial classical interpretation
is a classical interpretation where the truth of some atommay be left unspecified.
This is the same as saying that the interpretation maps all atoms into either f, t
or⊥. For a set of literalsX , with ¬.X we indicate the set {¬L:L ∈ X}, where for
any atom A, ¬¬A is replaced with A. Then, a classical interpretation (total or
partial) can also be represented as a consistent set of literals, i.e. I ⊆ BP ∪¬.BP
and for all atoms A, {A,¬A} 6⊆ I. Of course, the opposite is also true, i.e. a
consistent set of literals can straightforwardly be turned into an interpretation
over FOUR.
2The bilattice is complete w.r.t. t, so existential and universal quantification are well-
defined.
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2.3.4 Models
An interpretation I is a model of a logic program P , denoted by I |= P , if and
only if for each rule A← ϕ in P∗, I(ϕ) t I(A). With mod(P) we identify the
set of models of P .
From all models of a logic program P , Fitting [20, 21] identifies a sub-
set, which obeys the so-called Clark-completion procedure [9]. Essentially, we
replace in P∗ each occurrence of ← with ↔: an interpretation I is a Clark-
completion model, cl-model for short, of a logic program P , denoted by I |=cl P ,
if and only if for each rule A ← ϕ in P∗, I(A) = I(ϕ). With modcl(P) we
identify the set of cl-models of P . Of course modcl(P) ⊆ mod(P) holds.
Example 2.9 Consider the following logic program
P = {(A← ¬A), (A← α)} ,
where α is a value of a bilattice such that α t ¬α and A is a ground atom.
Then P∗ is
P∗ = {A← ¬A ∨ α} .
Consider Figure 3. The set of models of P, mod(P ), is the set of interpretations
assigning to A a value in the area (M -area in Figure 3) delimited by the extremal
points, α⊗ ¬α, α⊕ ¬α, α⊕ t, t and α⊗ t. The k-least element I of mod(P )
is such that I(A) = α⊗ t.
The set of cl-models of P, modcl(P ), is the set of interpretations assigning
to A a value on the vertical line, in between the extremal points α ⊗ ¬α and
α ⊕ ¬α and are all truth minimal. The k-least element I ′ of modcl(P ) is
such that I ′(A) = α ⊗ ¬α. Note that I is not a cl-model of P and, thus,
modcl(P ) ⊂ mod(P ).
Clark-completion models also have an alternative characterisation.
Definition 2.10 (general reduct) Let P and I be a logic program and an
interpretation, respectively. The general reduct of P w.r.t. I, denoted P [I] is
the program obtained from P∗ in which each (ground) rule A ← ϕ ∈ P∗ is
replaced with A← I(ϕ).
Note that any model J of P [I] is such that for all rules A ← ϕ ∈ P∗, I(ϕ) t
J(A). But, in P∗ each ground atom appears in the head of exactly one rule.
Therefore, it is easily verified that any t-minimal model J of P [I] is such that
J(A) = I(ϕ) and there can be just one such model, i.e. J = mint{J
′: J ′ |=
P [I]}.
We have the following theorem, which allows us to express the cl-models of
a logic program in terms of its models.
Theorem 2.11 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. Then I |=cl P iff I = mint{J : J |= P [I]}.
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Figure 3: Models and cl-models.
Proof. I |=cl P iff for all A← ϕ ∈ P∗, I(A) = I(ϕ) holds iff (as noted above)
I = mint{J : J |= P [I]}.
The above theorem establishes that Clark-completion models are fixed-points
of the operator ΓP : I(B)→ I(B), defined as
ΓP(I) = min
t
{J : J |= P [I]} , (2)
i.e. I |=cl P iff I = ΓP(I).
2.3.5 Program knowledge completions
Finally, given an interpretation I, we introduce the notion of program knowledge
completion, or simply, k-completion with I, denoted P ⊕ I. The program k-
completion of P with I, is the program obtained by replacing any rule of the
form A← ϕ ∈ P by A← ϕ⊕ I(A). The idea is to enforce any model J of P ⊕ I
to contain at least the knowledge determined by P and I. Note that J |= P ⊕ I
does not imply J |= P . For instance, given P = {A← A⊗¬A} and I = J = If,
then P ⊕ I = {A← (A⊗ ¬A)⊕ f} and J |= P ⊕ I, while J 6|= P .
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2.3.6 Additional remarks
Please note that the use of the negation, ¬, in literals has to be understood as
classical negation. The expression not L (where L is a literal) appearing quite
often as syntactical construct in logic programs, indicating ‘L is not provable’,
is not part of our language. This choice is intentional, as we want to stress
that in this study CWA will be considered as an additional source of (or carrier
of) falsehood in an abstract sense and will be considered as a ‘cumulative’
information source with the classical semantics (Kripke-Kleene semantics). In
this sense, our approach is an attempt to relate the stable model semantics
of logic programs to a standard model-theoretic account of rules, relying on
standard logical means as the notion of interpretation and knowledge ordering.
2.4 Semantics of logic programs
In logic programming, usually the semantics of a program P is determined by
selecting a particular interpretation, or a set of interpretations, of P in the set
of models of P . We consider three semantics, which are probably the most
popular and widely studied semantics for logic programs with negation, namely
Kripke-Kleene semantics, well-founded semantics and stable model semantics,
in increasing order of knowledge.
2.4.1 Kripke-Kleene semantics
Kripke-Kleene semantics [22] has a simple, intuitive and epistemic character-
ization, as it corresponds to the least cl-model of a logic program under the
knowledge order k. Kripke-Kleene semantics is essentially a generalization
of the least model characterization of classical programs without negation over
the truth space {f, t} (see [19, 33]) to logic programs with classical negation
evaluated over bilattices under Clark’s program completion. More formally,
Definition 2.12 (Kripke-Kleene semantics) The Kripke-Kleene model of
a logic program P is the k-least cl-model of P, i.e.
KK(P) = min
k
({I: I |=cl P}) . (3)
For instance, by referring to Example 2.9, the value of A w.r.t. the Kripke-Kleene
semantics of P is KK(P)(A) = α⊗ ¬α.
Note that by Theorem 2.11 and by Equation (2) we have also
KK(P) = lfpk(ΓP) . (4)
Kripke-Kleene semantics also has an alternative, and better known, fixed-point
characterization, which relies on the well-known ΦP immediate consequence
operator. ΦP is a generalization of the Van Emden-Kowalski’s immediate con-
sequence operator TP [19, 33] to bilattices under Clark’s program completion.
Interesting properties of ΦP are that (i) ΦP relies on the classical evaluation
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of negation, i.e. the evaluation of a negative literal ¬A is given by the negation
of the evaluation of A; and (ii) ΦP is monotone with respect to the knowl-
edge ordering and, thus, has a k-least fixed-point, which coincides with the
Kripke-Kleene semantics of P . Formally,
Definition 2.13 (immediate consequence operator ΦP) Consider a logic
program P. The immediate consequence operator ΦP : I(B) → I(B) is defined
as follows. For I ∈ I(B), ΦP(I) is the interpretation, which for any ground
atom A such that A← ϕ occurs in P∗, satisfies ΦP(I)(A) = I(ϕ).
It can easily be shown that
Theorem 2.14 ([20]) In the space of interpretations, the operator ΦP is mono-
tone under k, the set of fixed-points of ΦP is a complete lattice under k and,
thus, ΦP has a k-least fixed-point. Furthermore, I is a cl-model of a program P
iff I is a fixed-point of ΦP . Therefore, the Kripke-Kleene model of P coincides
with ΦP ’s least fixed-point under k.
For instance, by referring to Example 2.9, the set of fixed-points of ΦP coincides
with the set of interpretations assigning to A a value on the vertical line, in
between the extremal points α⊗ ¬α and α⊕ ¬α.
The above theorem relates the model theoretic and epistemic characteriza-
tion of the Kripke-Kleene semantics to a least fixed-point characterization. By
relying on ΦP we also know how to effectively compute KK(P) as given by the
Knaster-Tarski Theorem 2.1.
Please, note that from Theorem 2.11 and Equation (2), it follows immedi-
ately that
Corollary 2.15 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. Then ΦP(I) = ΓP(I).
Proof. Let I ′ = ΓP(I) = mint({J : J |= P [I]}). Then we have that for any
ground atom A, ΓP(I)(A) = I
′(A) = I(ϕ) = ΦP(I)(A), i.e. ΦP(I) = ΓP(I).
As a consequence, all definitions and properties given in this paper in terms of
ΦP and/or cl-models may be given in terms of ΓP and/or models as well. As
ΦP is a well-known operator, for ease of presentation we will continue use it.
We conclude this section with the following simple lemma, which will be
used later in the paper.
Lemma 2.16 Let P be a logic program and let J and I be interpretations. Then
ΦP⊕I(J) = ΦP(J)⊕ I. In particular, J |=cl P ⊕ I iff J = ΦP(J)⊕ I.
2.4.2 Stable model and well-founded semantics
A commonly accepted approach towards provide a stronger semantics or a se-
mantics that is more informative to logic programs than the Kripke-Kleene
semantics, consists in relying on CWA to complete the available knowledge. Of
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the various approaches to the management of negation in logic programming,
the stable model semantics approach, introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [25]
with respect to the classical two valued truth space {f, t} has become one of the
most widely studied and most commonly accepted proposal. Informally, a set of
ground atoms I is a stable model of a classical logic program P if I = I ′, where
I ′ is computed according to the so-called Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation:
1. substitute (fix) in P∗ the negative literals by their evaluation with respect
to I. Let PI be the resulting positive program, called reduct of P w.r.t. I;
2. let I ′ be the minimal Herbrand (truth-minimal) model of PI .
This approach defines a whole family of models and it has been shown in [44]
that the minimal one according to the knowledge ordering corresponds to the
well-founded semantics [49].
The extension of the notions of stable model and well-founded semantics to
the context of bilattices is due to Fitting [20]. He proposes a generalization
of the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation to bilattices by means of the binary
immediate consequence operator ΨP . Similarly to that of the Gelfond-Lifschitz
transformation, the basic principle of ΨP is to separate the roles of positive and
negative information. Informally, ΨP accepts two input interpretations over
a bilattice, the first is used to assign meanings to positive literals, while the
second is used to assign meanings to negative literals. ΨP is monotone in both
arguments in the knowledge orderingk. But, with respect to the truth ordering
t, ΨP is monotone in the first argument, while it is antitone in the second
argument (indeed, as the truth of a positive literal increases, the truth of its
negation decreases). Computationally, Fitting follows the idea of the Gelfond-
Lifschitz transformation shown above: the idea is to fix an interpretation for
negative information and to compute the t-least model of the resulting positive
program. To this end, Fitting [20] additionally introduced the Ψ′P operator,
which for a given interpretation I of negative literals, computes the t-least
model, Ψ′P(I) = lfpt(λx.ΨP (x, I)). The fixed-points of Ψ
′
P are the stable
models, while the least fixed-point of Ψ′P under k is the well-founded semantics
of P .
Formally, let I and J be two interpretations in the bilattice 〈I(B),t,k〉.
The notion of pseudo-interpretation I△J over the bilattice is defined as follows
(I gives meaning to positive literals, while J gives meaning to negative literals):
for a pure ground atom A:
(I △ J)(A) = I(A)
(I △ J)(¬A) = ¬J(A) .
Pseudo-interpretations are extended to non-literals in the obvious way. We can
now define ΨP as follows.
Definition 2.17 (immediate consequence operator ΨP) The immediate con-
sequence operator ΨP : I(B) × I(B) → I(B) is defined as follows. For I, J ∈
I(B), ΨP(I, J) is the interpretation, which for any ground atom A such that
A← ϕ occurs in P∗, satisfies ΨP(I, J)(A) = (I △ J)(ϕ).
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Note that ΦP is a special case of ΨP , as from construction ΦP(I) = ΨP(I, I).
The following theorem can be shown.
Theorem 2.18 ([20]) In the space of interpretations the operator ΨP is mono-
tone in both arguments under k, and under the ordering t it is monotone in
its first argument and antitone in its second argument.
We are ready now to define the Ψ′P operator.
Definition 2.19 (stability operator Ψ′P) The stability operator of ΨP is
the single input operator Ψ′P given by: Ψ
′
P(I) is the t-least fixed-point of the
operator λx.ΨP (x, I), i.e. Ψ
′
P(I) = lfpt(λx.ΨP (x, I)).
By Theorem 2.18, Ψ′P is well defined and can be computed in the usual way:
let I be an interpretation. Consider the following sequence: for i ≥ 0,
vI0 = If ,
vIi+1 = ΨP(v
I
i , I) .
Then the vIi sequence is monotone non-decreasing under t and converges to
Ψ′P(I). In the following, with v
I
i we will always indicate the i-th iteration of the
computation of Ψ′P(I).
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 2.20 ([20]) The operator Ψ′P is monotone in the k ordering, and
antitone in the t ordering. Furthermore, every fixed-point of Ψ′P is also a
fixed-point of ΦP , i.e. a cl-model of P.
Finally, following Fitting’s formulation,
Definition 2.21 (stable model) A stable model for a logic program P is a
fixed-point of Ψ′P . With stable(P) we indicate the set of stable models of P.
Note that it can be seen immediately from the definition of Ψ′P that
Ψ′P(I) = min
t
(mod(P I)) 3
and, thus,
I ∈ stable(P) iff I = min
t
(mod(PI)) . (5)
By Theorem 2.20 and the Knaster-Tarski Theorem 2.1, the set of fixed-points of
Ψ′P , i.e. the set of stable models of P , is a complete lattice under k and, thus,
Ψ′P has a k-least fixed-point, which is denoted WF (P). WF (P) is known
3As PI is positive, it has a unique truth-minimal model.
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as the well-founded model of P and, by definition, coincides with the k-least
stable model, i.e.
WF (P) = min
k
({I: I stable model of P}) . (6)
The characterization of the well-founded model in terms of least fixed-point of
Ψ′P also gives us a way to effectively compute it.
It is interesting to note, that for classical logic programs the original defini-
tion of well-founded semantics is based on the well-known notion of unfounded
set [49]. The underlying principle of the notion of unfounded sets is to identify
the set of atoms that can safely be assumed false if the current information
about a logic program is given by an interpretation I. Indeed, given a classical
interpretation I and a classical logic program P , a set of ground atoms X ⊆ BP
is an unfounded set (i.e., the atoms in X can be assumed as false) for P w.r.t. I
iff for each atom A ∈ X ,
1. if A ← ϕ ∈ P∗ (note that ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn and ϕi = Li1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lin),
then ϕi is false either w.r.t. I or w.r.t. ¬.X , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A well-known property of unfounded sets is that the union of two unfounded
sets of P w.r.t. I is an unfounded set as well and, thus, there is a unique greatest
unfounded set for P w.r.t. I, denoted by UP(I).
Now, consider the usual immediate consequence operator TP , where for any
ground atom A,
TP(I)(A) = t iff ∃A← ϕ ∈ P
∗ s.t. I(ϕ) = t,
and consider the well-founded operator [49] over classical interpretations I
WP(I) = TP(I) ∪ ¬.UP(I) . (7)
WP(I) can be rewritten asWP(I) = TP(I)⊕¬.UP(I), by assuming ⊕ = ∪,⊗ =
∩ in the lattice 〈2BP∪¬.BP ,⊆〉 (the partial order ⊆ corresponds to the knowledge
order k). Then,
• the well-founded semantics is defined to be the k-least fixed-point of WP
in [49], and
• it is shown in [30] that the set of total stable models of P coincides with
the set of total fixed-points of WP .
In particular, this formulation reveals that the greatest unfounded set, ¬.UP(I),
is the additional “false default knowledge”, which is introduced by CWA into
the usual semantics of logic programs given by TP . However,WP does not allow
partial stable models to be identified. Indeed, there are fixed-points of WP(I)
that are partial interpretations, which are not stable models.
We conclude the preliminary part of the paper with the following result that
adds to Fitting’s analysis that stable models are incomparable with each other
with respect to the truth order t.
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Theorem 2.22 Let I and J be two stable models such that I 6= J . Then I 6t J
and J 6t I.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that either I t J or J t I holds. Without
loss of generality, assume I t J . By Theorem 2.20, Ψ′P is antitone in the t
ordering. Therefore, from I t J it follows that J = Ψ′P(J) t Ψ
′
P(I) = I holds
and, thus, I = J , a contradiction to the hypothesis.
3 Stable model semantics revisited
In the following, by relying on CWA as a source of falsehood for knowledge
completion, we provide epistemic and fixed-point based, characterizations of
the well-founded and stable model semantics over bilattices that are alternative
to the one provided by Fitting [20]. We proceed in three steps.
(i) In the next section, we introduce the notion of support, denoted sP(I),
with respect to a logic program P and an interpretation I. The support is a gen-
eralization of the notion of greatest unfounded set (which determines the atoms
that can be assumed to be false) w.r.t. I from classical logic programming to
bilattices. Intuitively, we regard CWA as an additional source of information for
falsehood to be used to complete I. The support sP(I) of P w.r.t. I determines
in a principled way the amount, or degree, of falsehood provided by CWA to
the atom’s truth that can be added to current knowledge I about the program
P . It turns out that for classical logic programs the support coincides with the
negation of the greatest unfounded set, i.e. sP(I) = ¬.UP(I).
(ii) Any model I of P containing its support, i.e. such that sP(I) k I, tells
us that the additional source of falsehood provided by CWA cannot contribute
improving our knowledge about the program P . We call such models supported
models of P ; this will be discussed in Section 3.2. Supported models can be
characterized as fixed-points of the operator
Π˜P (I) = ΦP(I)⊕ sP(I) ,
which is very similar to the WP operator in Equation (7), but generalized to
bilattices. As expected, it can be shown that the k-least supported model is
the well-founded model of P . Unfortunately, while for classical logic programs
and total interpretations, supported models characterize total stable models (in
fact, they coincides with the fixed-points of WP ), this is not true in the general
case of interpretations over bilattices.
Therefore, we further refine the class of supported models, by introducing
the class of models deductively closed under support k-completion. This class
requires supported models to satisfy some minimality condition with respect to
the knowledge order k. Indeed, such a model I has to be deductively closed
according to the Kripke-Kleene semantics of the program k-completed with its
support, i.e.
I = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)) (8)
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or, equivalently
I = min
k
(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I)). (9)
(iii) We will show that any such interpretation I is a stable model of P
and vice-versa, i.e. I ∈ stable(P) iff I = mink(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I)), which is
quite suggestive. Note that until now, stable models (over bilattices) have been
characterized as by Equation (5). Equation (9) above shows thus that stable
models can be characterized as those models that contain their support and are
deductively closed under the Kripke-Kleene semantics. As such, we can identify
the support (unfounded set, in classical terms) as the added-value (in terms of
knowledge), which is brought into by the stable model semantics with respect
to the standard Kripke-Kleene semantics of P .
Finally, stable models can thus be defined in terms of fixed-points of the
operator KK(P ⊕ sP(·)), which relies on a, though intuitive, program transfor-
mation P ⊕ sP(·). We further introduce a new operator Φ′P , which we show to
have the property that Φ′P(I) = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)). This operator clearly shows
that a model is a stable model iff it contains exactly the knowledge obtained
by activating the rules over its support, without any other extra knowledge.
An important property of Φ′P is that it does depend on ΦP only. This may be
important in the classical logic programming case where P ⊕ sP(·) is not easy
to define (as ⊕ does not belong to the language of classical logic programs).
As a consequence, no program transformation is required, which completes our
analysis.
We will rely on the following running example to illustrate the concepts that
will be introduced in the next sections.
Example 3.1 (running example) Consider the following logic program P
with the following rules.
p← p
q ← ¬r
r ← ¬q ∧ ¬p
In Table 1 we report the cl-models Ii, the Kripke-Kleene, the well-founded and
the stable models of P, marked by bullets. Note that according to Theorem 2.22,
stable models cannot be compared with each other under t, while under the
knowledge order, I3 is the least informative model (i.e. the well-founded model),
while I6 is the most informative one (I4 and I5 are incomparable under k).
3.1 Support
The main notion we introduce here is that of support of a logic program P with
respect to a given interpretation I. If I represents what we already know about
an intended model of P , the support represents the k-greatest amount/degree
of falsehood provided by CWA that can be joined to I in order to complete
I. Falsehood is always represented in terms of an interpretation, which we
call a safe interpretation. The main principle underlying safe interpretations
19
Table 1: Models, Kripke-Kleene, well-founded and stable models of P .
Ii |=cl P p q r KK(P) WF (P) stable models
I1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ •
I2 ⊥ t f
I3 f ⊥ ⊥ • •
I4 f f t •
I5 f t f •
I6 f ⊤ ⊤ •
I7 t t f
I8 ⊤ t f
I9 ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
can be explained as follows. For ease, let us consider FOUR. Consider an
interpretation I, which is our current knowledge about P . Let us assume that
the interpretation J , with J k If, indicates which atoms may be assumed as
f. For any ground atom A, J(A) is the default ‘false’ information provided by J
to the atom A. The completion of I with J is the interpretation I ⊕J . In order
to accept this completion, we have to ensure that the assumed false knowledge
about A, J(A), is entailed by P w.r.t. the completed interpretation I⊕J , i.e. for
A ← ϕ ∈ P∗, J(A) k (I ⊕ J)(ϕ) should hold. That is, after completing the
current knowledge I about P with the ‘falsehood’ assumption J , the inferred
information about A, (I ⊕ J)(ϕ), should increase. Formally,
Definition 3.2 (safe interpretation) Let P and I be a logic program and an
interpretation, respectively. An interpretation J is safe w.r.t. P and I iff:
1. J k If;
2. J k ΦP(I ⊕ J).
As anticipated, safe interpretations have an interesting reading once we restrict
our attention to the classical framework of logic programming: indeed, the
concept of safe interpretation reduces to that of unfounded set.
Theorem 3.3 Let P and I be a classical logic program and a classical inter-
pretation, respectively. Let X be a subset of BP . Then X is an unfounded set
of P w.r.t. I iff ¬.X k ΦP(I ⊕ ¬.X) 4, i.e. ¬.X is safe w.r.t. P and I.
Proof. Assume ¬A ∈ ¬.X ( i.e. ¬.X(¬A) = t) and, thus, A ∈ X (i.e. X(A) =
f). Therefore, by definition of unfounded sets, if A ← ϕ ∈ P∗, where ϕ =
ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn and ϕi = Li1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lin , then either I(ϕi) = f or ¬.X(ϕi) = f.
Therefore, (I ∪ ¬.X)(ϕ) = f, i.e. (I ⊕ ¬.X)(ϕ) = f. But then, by definition of
ΦP , we have that ΦP(I ⊕ ¬.X)(A) = f, i.e. ΦP(I ⊕ ¬.X)(¬A) = t. Therefore,
¬.X k ΦP(I ⊕ ¬.X). The other direction can be shown similarly.
The following example illustrates the concept.
4Note that this condition can be rewritten as ¬.X ⊆ ΦP (I ∪ ¬.X).
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Example 3.4 (running example cont.) Let us consider I2. I2 dictates that
p is unknown, q is true and that r is false. Consider the interpretations Ji
defined as follows:
Ji p q r
J1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
J2 f ⊥ ⊥
J3 ⊥ ⊥ f
J4 f ⊥ f
It is easy to verify that Ji k If and Ji k ΦP(I2 ⊕ Ji). Therefore, all the
Jis are safe. The k-least safe interpretation is J1, while the k-greatest safe
interpretation is J4 = J1 ⊕ J2 ⊕ J3. J4 dictates that under I2, we can ‘safely’
assume that both p and r are false. Note that if we join J4 to I2 we obtain the
stable model I5, where I2 k I5. Thus, J4 improves the knowledge expressed by
I2.
It might be asked why we do not consider q false as well. In fact, if we
consider p, q and r false, after joining to I and applying ΦP , q becomes true,
which is knowledge-incompatible with q’s previous knowledge status (q is false).
So, q’s falsehood is not preserved.
We also consider another example on a more general bilattice allowing the man-
agement of uncertainty.
Example 3.5 Let us consider the lattice 〈L,〉, where L is the unit interval
[0, 1] and  is the natural linear order ≤. The negation operator on L con-
sidered is defined as ¬x = 1 − x. We further build the bilattice of intervals
〈[0, 1]× [0, 1],t,k〉 in the standard way. An interval 〈x, y〉 may be under-
stood as an approximation of the certainty of an atom.
Let us note that for x, x′, y, y′ ∈ L,
• 〈x, y〉 ∧ 〈x′, y′〉 = 〈min(x, x′),min(y, y′)〉;
• 〈x, y〉 ∨ 〈x′, y′〉 = 〈max(x, x′),max(y, y′)〉;
• 〈x, y〉 ⊗ 〈x′, y′〉 = 〈min(x, x′),max(y, y′)〉;
• 〈x, y〉 ⊕ 〈x′, y′〉 = 〈max(x, x′),min(y, y′)〉; and
• ¬〈x, y〉 = 〈1− y, 1− x〉.
Consider the logic program P with rules
A← A ∧ C
B ← B ∨ ¬C
C ← C ∨D
D ← [0.7, 0.7]
The fourth rule asserts that the truth value of D is exactly 0.7. Then using the
third rule, we will infer that the value of C is given by the disjunction of 0.7 and
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the value of C itself which is initially unknown, i.e. between 0 and 1, thus our
knowledge about C is that its value is at least 0.7, i.e. [0.7;1]. Activating the
second rule with that knowledge, then the value of B is given by the disjunction
of the value of ¬C, that is at most 0.3, i.e. [0;0.3], and the value of B itself that
is unknown, thus B remains unknown. Similarly, the first rule does not provide
any knowledge about the value of A. That knowledge corresponds to the Kripke-
Kleene model I of P, obtained by iterating ΦP starting with I⊥ : I(A) = [0; 1],
I(B) = [0; 1], I(C) = [0.7; 1] and I(D) = [0.7; 0.7].
Relying on CWA, we should be able to provide a more precise characterization
of A, B and C. It can be verified that it may be safely assumed that A is false
([0; 0]) and that the truth of B and C is at most 0.3 and 0.7, respectively, which
combined with I determines a more precise interpretation where A is false, B is
at most 0.3, C is 0.7 and D is 0.7, respectively, as highlighted in the following
table. Consider interpretations I, J1, J2, J
′.
A B C D
I [0; 1] [0; 1] [0.7; 1] [0.7; 0.7]
J1 [0; 0] [0; 1] [0; 0.8] [0; 0.7]
J2 [0; 1] [0; 0.3] [0; 0.7] [0; 1]
J ′ [0; 0] [0; 0.3] [0; 0.7] [0; 0.7]
I ⊕ J ′ [0; 0] [0.0; 0.3] [0.7; 0.7] [0.7; 0.7]
Both J1 and J2 are safe w.r.t. P and I. It is easy to see that J ′ = J1⊕J2 is the
k-greatest safe interpretation. Interestingly, note how J
′ provides to I some
additional information on the values of A, B and C, respectively.
Of all possible safe interpretations w.r.t. P and I, we are interested in the
maximal one under k, which is unique. The k-greatest safe interpretation
will be called the support provided by CWA to P w.r.t. I.
Definition 3.6 (support) Let P and I be a logic program and an interpreta-
tion, respectively. The support provided by CWA to P w.r.t. I, or simply sup-
port of P w.r.t. I, denoted sP(I), is the k-greatest safe interpretation w.r.t. P
and I, and is given by
sP(I) =
⊕
{J : J is safe w.r.t. P and I} .
It is easy to show that support is a well-defined concept. Consider X = {J : J is
safe w.r.t. P and I}. As the bilattice is a complete lattice under k, lubk(X) =
⊕J∈XJ and, thus, by definition sP(I) = lubk(X). Now consider J ∈ X .
Therefore J k sP(I). But J is safe, so J k If and J k ΦP(I ⊕ J) k
ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) (by k-monotonicity of ΦP). As a consequence, both If and
ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) are upper bounds of X . But sP(I) is the least upper bound of
X and, thus, sP(I) k If and sP(I) k ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) follows. That is, sP(I)
is safe and the k-greatest safe interpretation w.r.t. P and I.
It follows immediately from Theorem 3.3 that, in the classical setting, the
notion of greatest unfounded set is captured by the notion of support, i.e. the
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Table 2: Running example cont.: support of P w.r.t. Ii.
Ii sP (Ii) stable
Ii |=cl P p q r p q r UP(Ii) KK(P) WF (P) models
I1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} •
I2 ⊥ t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I3 f ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} • •
I4 f f t f f ⊥ {p, q} •
I5 f t f f ⊥ f {p, r} •
I6 f ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r} •
I7 t t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I8 ⊤ t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I9 ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r}
support tells us which atoms may be safely assumed to be false, given a clas-
sical interpretation I and a classical logic program P . Therefore, the notion of
support extends the notion of greatest unfounded sets from the classical setting
to bilattices.
Corollary 3.7 Let P and I be a classical logic program and a classical inter-
pretation, respectively. Then sP(I) = ¬.UP(I).
Example 3.8 (running example cont.) Table 2 extends Table 1 also by in-
cluding the supports sP(Ii). Note that, according to Corollary 3.7, sP(Ii) =
¬.UP(Ii).
Having defined the support model-theoretically, we next show how the support
can effectively be computed as the iterated fixed-point of a function, σIP , that de-
pends on ΦP only. Intuitively, the iterated computation weakens If, i.e. CWA,
until we arrive to the k-greatest safe interpretation, i.e. the support.
Definition 3.9 (support function) Let P and I be a logic program and an
interpretation, respectively. The support function, denoted σIP , w.r.t. P and I
is the function mapping interpretations into interpretations defined as follows:
for any interpretation J ,
σIP (J) = If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕ J) .
It is easy to verify that σIP is monotone w.r.t. k. The following theorem
determines how to compute the support.
Theorem 3.10 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. Consider the iterated sequence of interpretations F Ii defined as follows:
for any i ≥ 0,
F I0 = If ,
F Ii+1 = σ
I
P(F
I
i ) .
The sequence F Ii is
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1. monotone non-increasing under k and, thus, reaches a fixed-point F Iλ ,
for a limit ordinal λ; and
2. is monotone non-decreasing under t.
Furthermore, sP(I) = F
I
λ
holds.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Concerning Point 1., F I1 k F
I
0 ; for all
successor ordinal i, as σIP is monotone under k, if F
I
i+1 k F
I
i then F
I
i+2 k
F Ii+1; and for all limit ordinal λ, if i < λ then F
I
λ
=
⊗
i<λ
F Ii k F
I
i . Thus the
sequence is monotone non-increasing under k. Therefore, the sequence has a
fixed-point at the limit, say F I
λ
.
Concerning Point 2., F I0 t F
I
1 ; for all successor ordinal i, from F
I
i+1 k F
I
i ,
by Lemma 2.4, we have F Ii = F
I
i ⊗If t F
I
i+1; and similarly, for all limit ordinal
λ, if i < λ, we have F I
λ
k F Ii , and by Lemma 2.4, F
I
i = F
I
i ⊗ If t F
I
λ
.
Let us show that F I
λ
is safe and k-greatest. F Iλ = σ
I
P(F
I
λ
) = If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕
F I
λ
). Therefore, F I
λ
k If and F
I
λ
k ΦP(I ⊕F Iλ ), so F
I
λ
is safe w.r.t. P and I.
Consider anyX safe w.r.t. P and I. We show by induction on i thatX k F Ii
and, thus, at the limit X k F Iλ , so F
I
λ
is k-greatest.
(i) Case i = 0. By definition, X k If = F
I
0 .
(ii) Induction step: suppose X k F Ii . Since X is safe, we have X k
X ⊗ X k If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕ X). By induction, using the monotonicity of σ
I
P
w.r.t. k, X k If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕ F
I
i ) = F
I
i+1.
(iii) Transfinite induction: given an ordinal limit λ, suppose X k F Ii holds
for all i < λ. Using the fact that the space of interpretations 〈I(B),t,k〉 is an
infinitary interlaced bilattice, we have X k
⊗
i<λ
F Ii = F
I
λ
, which concludes
the proof.
In the following, with F Ii we indicate the i-th iteration of the computation of
the support of P w.r.t. I, according to Theorem 3.10.
Note that by construction
sP(I) = If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) , (10)
which establishes also that the support is deductively closed in terms of false-
hood. In fact, even if we add all that we know about the atom’s falsehood to
the current interpretation I, we know no more about the atom’s falsehood than
we knew before.
Interestingly, for a classical logic program P and a classical interpretation
I, by Corollary 3.7, the above method gives us a simple top-down method to
compute the negation of the greatest unfounded set, ¬.UP(I), as the limit of
the sequence:
F I0 = ¬.BP ,
F Ii+1 = ¬.BP ∩ ΦP(I ∪ F
I
i ) .
The support sP(I) can be seen as an operator over the space of interpretations.
The following theorem asserts that the support is monotone w.r.t. k.
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Theorem 3.11 Let P be a logic program. The support operator sP is monotone
w.r.t. k.
Proof. Consider two interpretations I and J , where I k J . Consider the two
sequences F Ii and F
J
i . We show by induction on i that F
I
i k F
J
i and, thus, at
the limit sP(I) k sP(J).
(i) Case i = 0. By definition, F I0 = If k If = F
J
0 .
(ii) Induction step: suppose F Ii k F
J
i . By monotonicity under k of ΦP
and the induction hypothesis, F Ii+1 = If ⊗ΦP(I ⊕ F
I
i ) k If ⊗ΦP(J ⊕ F
J
i ) =
F Ji+1, which concludes.
The next corollary follows directly from Lemma 2.4.
Corollary 3.12 Let P be a logic program and consider two interpretations I
and J such that I k J . Then sP(J) t sP(I).
3.2 Models based on the support
Of all possible models of a program P , we are especially interested in those mod-
els I that already integrate their own support, i.e. that could not be completed
by CWA.
Definition 3.13 (supported model) Consider a logic program P. An inter-
pretation I is a supported model of P iff I |=cl P and sP(I) k I.
If we consider the definition of support in the classical setting, then supported
models are classical models of classical logic programs such that ¬.UP (I) ⊆ I,
i.e. the false atoms provided by the greatest unfounded set are already false in
the interpretation I. Therefore, CWA does not further contribute improving I’s
knowledge about the program P .
Example 3.14 (running example cont.) Table 3 extends Table 2 by also in-
cluding supported models. Note that while both I8 and I9 are models of P in-
cluding their support, they are not stable models. Note also that sP(I8) = sP(I5)
and sP(I9) = sP(I6). That is, I8 and I9, which are not stable models, have the
same support of some stable model.
Supported models have interesting properties, as stated below.
Theorem 3.15 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. The following statements are equivalent:
1. I is a supported model of P;
2. I = ΦP(I)⊕ sP(I);
3. I |=cl P ⊕ sP(I);
4. I = ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)).
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Table 3: Running example cont.: supported models of P .
Ii sP (Ii) stable supported
Ii |=cl P p q r p q r UP (Ii) KK(P) WF (P) models models
I1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} •
I2 ⊥ t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I3 f ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} • • •
I4 f f t f f ⊥ {p, q} • •
I5 f t f f ⊥ f {p, r} • •
I6 f ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r} • •
I7 t t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I8 ⊤ t f f ⊥ f {p, r} •
I9 ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r} •
Proof. Assume Point 1. holds, i.e. I |=cl P and sP(I) k I. Then, I = ΦP(I) =
ΦP(I)⊕ sP(I), so Point 2. holds.
Assume Point 2. holds. Then, by Lemma 2.16, I = ΦP(I) ⊕ sP(I) =
ΦP⊕sP(I)(I), i.e. I |=cl P ⊕ sP(I), so Point 3. holds.
Assume Point 3. holds. So, sP(I) k I and from the safeness of sP(I), it
follows that sP(I) k ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) = ΦP(I) and, thus, I = ΦP⊕sP(I)(I) =
ΦP(I) ⊕ sP(I) = ΦP(I). Therefore, ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) = ΦP(I) = I, so Point 4.
holds.
Finally, assume Point 4. holds. From the safeness of sP(I), it follows that
sP(I) k ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) = I. Therefore, I = ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) = ΦP(I) and, thus
I is a supported model of P . So, Point 1. holds, which concludes the proof.
The above theorem states the same concept in different ways: supported models
contain the amount of knowledge expressed by the program and their support.
From a fixed-point characterization point of view, from Theorem 3.15 it
follows that the set of supported models can be identified by the fixed-points of
the k-monotone operators ΠP and Π˜P defined by
ΠP(I) = ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) , (11)
Π˜P(I) = ΦP(I)⊕ sP(I) . (12)
It follows immediately that
Theorem 3.16 Let P be a logic program. Then Π˜P (ΠP) is monotone un-
der k. Furthermore, an interpretation I is a supported model iff I = Π˜P(I)
(I = ΠP (I)) and, thus, relying on the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem (The-
orem 2.1), the set of supported models is a complete lattice under k.
Note that ΠP has been defined first in [38] without recognizing that it char-
acterizes supported models. However, it has been shown in [38] that the least
fixed-point under k coincides with the well-founded semantics, i.e. in our con-
text, the k-least supported model of P is the well-founded semantics of P .
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Theorem 3.17 ([38]) Consider a logic program P. ThenWF (P) = lfpk(ΠP )
(WF (P) = lfpk(Π˜P)) and stable models are fixed-points of ΠP (Π˜P).
Example 3.18 (running example cont.) Consider Table 3. Note that sta-
ble models are supported models, i.e. fixed-points of Π˜P (ΠP), and that the k-
least supported model coincides with the well-founded model. Additionally, I8
and I9 are fixed-points of Π˜P (ΠP) and not stable models. Thus, stable models
are a proper subset of supported models.
Note that the above theorem is not surprising considering that the Π˜P operator
is quite similar to the WP operator defined in Equation (7) for classical logic
programs and interpretations. The above theorem essentially extends the re-
lationship to general logic programs interpreted over bilattices. But, while for
classical logical programs and total interpretations, Π˜P(I) characterizes stable
total models (as, Π˜P = WP ), this is not true in the general case of interpreta-
tions over bilattices (e.g., see Table 3).
As highlighted in Examples 3.14 and 3.18, supported models are not specific
enough to completely identify stable models: we must further refine the notion
of supported models. Example 3.14 gives us a hint. For instance, consider
the supported model I8. As already noted, the support (in classical terms, the
greatest unfounded set) of I8 coincides with that of I5, but for this support,
i.e. sP(I5), I5 is the k-least informative cl-model, i.e. I5 k I8. Similarly,
for support sP(I6), I6 is the k-least informative cl-model, i.e. I6 k I9. It
appears clearly that some supported models contain knowledge that cannot
be inferred from the program or from CWA. This may suggest partitioning
supported models into sets of cl-models with a given support and then taking
the least informative one to avoid that the supported models contain unexpected
extra knowledge.
Formally, for a given interpretation I, we will consider the class of all models
of P⊕sP(I), i.e. interpretations which contain the knowledge entailed by P and
the support sP(I), and then take the k-least model. If this k-least model
is I itself then I is a supported model of P deductively closed under support
k-completion.
Definition 3.19 (model deductively closed under support k-completion)
Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively. Then
I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P iff I =
mink(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I))).
Note that by Lemma 2.16,
modcl(P ⊕ sP(I)) = {J : J = ΦP(J)⊕ sP(I)} . (13)
Therefore, if I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion then
I = ΦP(I) ⊕ sP(I), i.e. I |=cl P ⊕ sP(I). Therefore, by Theorem 3.15, any
model deductively closed under support k-completion is also a supported model,
i.e. I |=cl P and sP(I) k I.
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Table 4: Running example cont.: models deductively closed under support k-
completion of P .
Ii sP (Ii) stable supp. deductively
Ii |=cl P p q r p q r UP(Ii) KK(P) WF (P) models models closed models
I1 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} •
I2 ⊥ t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I3 f ⊥ ⊥ f ⊥ ⊥ {p} • • • •
I4 f f t f f ⊥ {p, q} • • •
I5 f t f f ⊥ f {p, r} • • •
I6 f ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r} • • •
I7 t t f f ⊥ f {p, r}
I8 ⊤ t f f ⊥ f {p, r} •
I9 ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ f f f {p, q, r} •
Interestingly, models deductively closed under support k-completion have
also a different, equivalent and quite suggestive characterization. In fact, from
the definition it follows immediately that
min
k
(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I))) = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)) .
It then follows that
Theorem 3.20 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. Then I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P iff
I = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)).
That is, given an interpretation I and logic program P , among all cl-models of
P , we are looking for the k-least cl-models deductively closed under support k-
completion, i.e. models containing only the knowledge that can be inferred from
P and from the safe part of CWA identified by its k-maximal safe interpretation.
Example 3.21 (running example cont.) Table 4 extends Table 3, by in-
cluding models deductively closed under support k-completion. Note that now
both I8 and I9 have been ruled out, as they are not minimal with respect to a given
support, i.e. I8 6= mink(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I8))) = mink(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I5))) =
KK(P ⊕ sP(I5)) = I5 and I9 6= KK(P ⊕ sP(I9)) = KK(P ⊕ sP(I6)) = I6.
Finally, we can note that an immediate consequence operator characterizing
models deductively closed under support k-completion can be derived immedi-
ately from Theorem 3.20, i.e. by relying on the operator KK(P ⊕ sP(·)). In
the following we present the operator Φ′P , which coincides with KK(P⊕sP(·)),
i.e. Φ′P(I) = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)) for any interpretation I, but does not require any,
even intuitive, program transformation like P ⊕ sP(·). This may be important
in the classical logic programming case where P ⊕ sP(·) is not easy to define (as
⊕ does not belong to the language of classical logic programs). Therefore, the
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set of models deductively closed under support k-completion coincides with the
set of fixed-points of Φ′P , which will be defined in terms of ΦP only.
Informally, given an interpretation I, Φ′P computes all the knowledge that
can be inferred from the rules and the support of P w.r.t. I without any other
extra knowledge. Formally,
Definition 3.22 (immediate consequence operator Φ′P) Consider a logic
program P and an interpretation I. The operator Φ′P maps interpretations into
interpretations and is defined as the limit of the sequence of interpretations JIi
defined as follows: for any i ≥ 0,
JI0 = sP(I) ,
JIi+1 = ΦP(J
I
i )⊕ J
I
i .
In the following, with JIi we indicate the i-th iteration of the immediate conse-
quence operator Φ′P , according to Definition 3.22.
Essentially, given the current knowledge expressed by I about an intended
model of P , we compute first the support, sP(I), and then cumulate all the
implicit knowledge that can be inferred from P , by starting from the support.
It is easy to note that the sequence JIi is monotone non-decreasing under k
and, thus has a limit. The following theorem follows directly from Theorems 2.14
and 3.11, and from the Knaster-Tarski theorem.
Theorem 3.23 Φ′P is monotone w.r.t. k. Therefore, Φ
′
P has a least (and a
greatest) fixed-point under k.
Finally, note that
• by definition Φ′P(I) = ΦP(Φ
′
P (I)) ⊕ Φ
′
P(I), and thus ΦP(Φ
′
P (I)) k
Φ′P(I); and
• for fixed-points of Φ′P we have that I = ΦP(I)⊕ I and, thus, ΦP(I) k I.
Before proving the last theorem of this section, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.24 Let P be a logic program and let I and K be interpretations. If
K |=cl P ⊕ sP(I) then Φ′P(I) k K.
Proof. Assume K |=cl P ⊕ sP(I), i.e. by Lemma 2.16, K = ΦP⊕sP(I)(K) =
ΦP(K) ⊕ sP(I). Therefore, sP(I) k K. We show by induction on i that
JIi k K and, thus, at the limit Φ
′
P(I) k K.
(i) Case i = 0. By definition, JI0 = sP(I) k K.
(ii) Induction step: suppose JIi k K. Then by assumption and by induction
we have that JIi+1 = ΦP(J
I
i )⊕J
I
i k ΦP(K)⊕K = ΦP(K)⊕ΦP(K)⊕sP(I) =
ΦP(K)⊕ sP(I) = K, which concludes.
The following concluding theorem characterizes the set of models deductively
closed under support k-completion in terms of fixed-points of Φ′P .
29
Theorem 3.25 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respec-
tively. Then Φ′P(I) = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)).
Proof. The Kripke-Kleene model (for ease denoted K) of P ⊕ sP(I) under k,
is the limit of the sequence
K0 = I⊥ ,
Ki+1 = ΦP⊕sP (I)(Ki) .
As K |=cl P ⊕ sP(I), by Lemma 3.24, Φ′P(I) k K. Now we show that K k
Φ′P(I), by proving by induction on i that Ki k Φ
′
P(I) and, thus, at the limit
K k Φ′P(I).
(i) Case i = 0. We have K0 = I⊥ k Φ′P(I).
(ii) Induction step: suppose Ki k Φ
′
P(I). Then, by induction we have
Ki+1 = ΦP⊕sP(I)(Ki) k ΦP⊕sP(I)(Φ
′
P (I)). As sP(I) k Φ
′
P(I), by Lemma 2.16
it follows thatKi+1 k ΦP⊕sP (I)(Φ
′
P (I)) = ΦP(Φ
′
P (I))⊕sP(I) k ΦP(Φ
′
P(I))⊕
Φ′P(I) = Φ
′
P(I), which concludes.
It follows immediately that
Corollary 3.26 An interpretation I is a model deductively closed under support
k-completion of P iff I is a fixed-point of Φ′P .
We will now state that the set of stable models coincides with the set of
models deductively closed under support k-completion. This statement implies
that our approach leads to an epistemic characterization of the family of stable
models. It also evidences the role of CWA in logic programming. Indeed, CWA
can be seen as the additional support of falsehood to be added cumulatively to
the Kripke-Kleene semantics to define some more informative semantics: the
well-founded and the stable model semantics. Moreover, it gives a new fixed-
point characterization of that family. Our fixed-point characterization is based
on ΦP only and neither requires any program transformation nor separation
of positive and negative literals/information. The proof of the following stable
model characterization theorem can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 3.27 (stable model characterization) Let P and I be a logic pro-
gram and an interpretation, respectively. The following statements are equiva-
lent:
1. I is a stable model of P;
2. I is a model deductively closed under support k-completion of P,
i.e. I = mink(modcl(P ⊕ sP(I)));
3. I = Φ′P(I);
4. I = KK(P ⊕ sP(I)).
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Considering a classical logic program P , a partial interpretation is a stable
model of P if and only if it is deductively closed under its greatest unfounded
set completion, i.e. if and only if it coincides with the limit of the sequence:
JI0 = ¬.UP(I) ,
JIi+1 = ΦP(J
I
i ) ∪ J
I
i .
Finally it is well-known that the least stable model of P w.r.t. k coincides
with P ’s well-founded semantics. Therefore, our approach also provides new
characterizations of the well-founded semantics of logic programs over bilattices.
Together with Theorem 3.17, we have
Corollary 3.28 Let P be a logic program. The following statements are equiv-
alent:
1. I is the well-founded semantics of P;
2. I is the k-least supported model of P, i.e. the k-least fixed-point of Π˜P ;
3. I is the k-least model deductively closed under support k-completion of
P, i.e. the k-least fixed-point of Φ′P .
Therefore, the well-founded semantics can be characterized by means of the
notion of supported models only. Additionally, we now also know why Π˜P
characterizes the well-founded model, while fails in characterizing stable models.
Indeed, from I = Π˜P(I) it follows that I is a model of P⊕sP(I), which does not
guarantee that I is the k-least cl-model of P⊕sP(I) (see Example 3.21). Thus,
I does not satisfy Theorem 3.20. If I is the k-least fixed-point of Π˜P , then I is
both a cl-model of P ⊕ sP(I) and k-least. Therefore, the k-least supported
model is always a model deductively closed under support k-completion as well
and, thus a stable model.
The following concluding example shows the various ways of computing the
well-founded semantics, according to the operators discussed in this study: Ψ′P
and Φ′P . But, rather than relying on FOUR as truth space, as we did in our
running example, we consider the bilattice of intervals over the unit [0, 1], used
frequently for reasoning under uncertainty.
Example 3.29 Let us consider the bilattice of intervals 〈[0, 1]× [0, 1],t,k〉
introduced in Example 3.5. Consider the following logic program P,
A ← A ∨B
B ← (¬C ∧A) ∨ 〈0.3, 0.5〉
C ← ¬B ∨ 〈0.2, 0.4〉
The table below shows the computation of the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P,
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KK(P), as k-least fixed-point of ΦP .
A B C Ki
〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 K0
〈0, 1〉 〈0.3, 1〉 〈0.2, 1〉 K1
〈0.3, 1〉 〈0.3, 0.8〉 〈0.2, 0.7〉 K2
〈0.3, 1〉 〈0.3, 0.8〉 〈0.2, 0.7〉 K3 = K2 = KK(P)
Note that knowledge increases during the computation as the intervals become
more precise, i.e. Ki k Ki+1.
The following table shows us the computation of the well-founded semantics
of P, WF (P), as k-least fixed-point of Ψ′P .
v
Wj
i A B C A B C Wj
vW0
0
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 W0
vW0
1
〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
vW0
2
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
vW0
3
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
vW1
0
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉 W1
vW1
1
〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
vW1
2
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
vW1
3
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
vW2
0
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 W2
vW2
1
〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
vW2
2
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
vW2
3
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 W3 = W2 = WF (P)
Note that Wi k Wi+1 and KK(P) k WF (P), as expected. We conclude
this example by showing the computation of the well-founded semantics of P, as
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k-least fixed-point of Φ′P .
F Ini A B C A B C In/J
In
j
F I0
0
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0, 1〉 I0
F I0
1
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
F I0
2
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
F I0
3
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉 JI0
0
= sP(I0)
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 1〉 JI0
1
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 JI0
2
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 JI0
3
F I1
0
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 I1
F I2
1
〈0, 0〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.7〉
F I2
2
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.7〉
F I2
3
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.7〉
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.5〉 〈0, 0.7〉 JI1
0
= sP(I1)
〈0, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 JI1
1
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 JI1
2
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 JI1
3
〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.3, 0.5〉 〈0.5, 0.7〉 I2 = I1 = WF (P)
Note how the knowledge about falsehood increases as our approximation to the
intended model increases, i.e. sP(Ii) k sP(Ii+1), while the degree of truth
decreases (sP(Ii+1) t sP(Ii)). Furthermore, note that WF (P) |=cl P and
sP(WF (P)) k WF (P), i.e. WF (P) is a supported model of P, compliant to
Corollary 3.28.
4 Conclusions
Stable model semantics has become a well-established and accepted approach to
the management of (non-monotonic) negation in logic programs. In this study
we have presented an alternative formulation to the Gelfond-Lifschitz transfor-
mation, which has widely been used to formulate stable model semantics. Our
approach is purely based on algebraic and semantical aspects of informative
monotone operators over bilattices. In this sense, we talk about epistemologi-
cal foundation of the stable model semantics. Our considerations are based on
the fact that we regard the closed world assumption as an additional source of
falsehood and identify with the support the amount/degree of falsehood carried
on by the closed world assumption. The support is the generalization of the no-
tion of the greatest unfounded set for classical logic programs to the context of
bilattices. The support is then used to complete the well-known Kripke-Kleene
semantics of logic programs. In particular,
1. with respect to well-founded semantics, we have generalized both the fixed-
point characterization of the well-founded semantics of [49] to bilattices
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Table 5: Well-founded semantics characterization: from classical logic to bilat-
tices.
1. I is the well-founded semantics of P
Classical logic {f,⊥, t} Bilattices
2. k-least I s.t. I = WP(I) = TP (I) ∪ ¬.UP (I) I = Π˜P (I) = ΦP (I) ⊕ sP (I)
3. k-least model I s.t. ¬.UP(I) ⊆ I sP (I) k I
(Point 2. in Table 5) and its model-theoretic characterization (Point 3. in
Table 5, see e.g. [30]).
2. concerning stable model semantics, we have shown that
I ∈ stable(P) iff I = min
k
(modcl(P⊕sP(I))) = KK(P⊕sP(I)) = Φ
′
P(I) ,
while previously stable models have been characterized by I ∈ stable(P)
iff I = mint(mod(P
I)).
Our result indicates that the support may be seen as the added-value to the
Kripke-Kleene semantics and evidences the role of CWA in the well-founded and
stable model semantics. It also shows that a separation of positive and negative
information is nor necessary (as required by the Gelfond-Lifschitz transform),
nor is any program transformation required.
As our approach is rather general and abstracts from the underlying logical
formalism (in our case logic programs), it may be applied to other contexts as
well.
A Proof of Theorem 3.27
This part is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.27. It relies on the following
intermediary results. We start by providing lemmas to show that fixed-points
of Φ′P are stable models.
Lemma A.1 If I t J and J k I, then If ⊗ ΨP(x, I) = If ⊗ ΨP(x, J), for
any interpretation x.
Proof. Using the antimonotonicity of ΨP w.r.t. t for its second argument, we
have If t ΨP(x, J) t ΨP(x, I). From Lemma 2.2, we have If ⊗ΨP(x, I) k
ΨP(x, J). Using the interlacing conditions, we have If ⊗ ΨP(x, I) k If ⊗
ΨP(x, J). Now, using the monotonicity of ΨP w.r.t. k and the interlacing
conditions, we have If ⊗ ΨP(x, J) k If ⊗ ΨP(x, I). It results that If ⊗
ΨP(x, I) = If ⊗ΨP(x, J).
Similarly, we have
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Lemma A.2 If J t I and J k I, then If ⊗ ΨP(I, x) = If ⊗ ΨP(J, x), for
any interpretation x.
Proof. Using the monotonicity of ΨP w.r.t. t for its first argument, we have
If t ΨP(J, x) t ΨP(I, x). From Lemma 2.2, we have If ⊗ ΨP(I, x) k
ΨP(J, x). Using the interlacing conditions, we have If ⊗ ΨP(I, x) k If ⊗
ΨP(J, x). Now, using the monotonicity of ΨP w.r.t. k and the interlacing
conditions, we have If ⊗ ΨP(J, x) k If ⊗ ΨP(I, x). It results that If ⊗
ΨP(I, x) = If ⊗ΨP(J, x).
Lemma A.3 If I = ΦP(I) then F
I
i t sP(I) t I, for all i.
Proof. By Theorem 3.10, the sequence F Ii is monotone non-decreasing under
t and F Ii t sP(I). Now, we show by induction on i that F
I
i t I and, thus,
at the limit sP(I) t I.
(i) Case i = 0. F I0 = If t I.
(ii) Induction step: let us assume that F Ii t I holds. By Lemma 2.3,
F Ii t F
I
i ⊕ I t I follows. We also have I k F
I
i ⊕ I and F
I
i k F
I
i ⊕ I. It
follows from Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 that F Ii+1 = If ⊗ ΨP(F
I
i ⊕ I, F
I
i ⊕
I) = If ⊗ ΨP(F
I
i , I). By induction F
I
i t I, so from I = ΦP(I), F
I
i+1 =
If ⊗ΨP(F
I
i , I) t ΨP(F
I
i , I) t ΨP(I, I) = ΦP(I) = I follows.
Lemma A.4 If I = ΦP(I) then for any i, sP(I) k F Ii k v
I
i and, thus, at
the limit sP(I) k Ψ′P(I).
Proof. By Theorem 3.10, sP(I) k F Ii , for all i. We know that v
I
i converges
to Ψ′P(I). We show by induction on i that F
I
i k v
I
i . Therefore, at the limit
sP(I) k Ψ
′
P(I).
(i) Case i = 0. F I0 = If k If = v
I
0 .
(ii) Induction step: assume that F Ii k v
I
i . By definition, F
I
i+1 = If ⊗
ΦP(I⊕F Ii ) = If⊗ΨP(I⊕F
I
i , I⊕F
I
i ). By Lemma A.3, F
I
i t I. By Lemma 2.3,
F Ii t F
I
i ⊕ I t I follows. We also have I k F
I
i ⊕ I and F
I
i k F
I
i ⊕ I. It
follows from Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 that F Ii+1 = If⊗ΨP(F
I
i ⊕I, F
I
i ⊕I) =
If ⊗ ΨP(F
I
i , I). By the induction hypothesis we know that F
I
i k v
I
i for any
n. Therefore, F Ii+1 k If ⊗ ΨP(v
I
i , I) k ΨP(v
I
i , I) = v
I
i+1 follows, which
concludes.
Lemma A.5 Let P and I be a logic program and an interpretation, respectively.
If I is a supported model then sP(I) = If ⊗ I.
Proof. By Equation 10 and Theorem 3.15, sP(I) = If ⊗ ΦP(I ⊕ sP(I)) =
If ⊗ I.
Lemma A.6 If I = Φ′P(I) then we have:
1. sP(I) t Ψ′P(I) t I; and
2. sP(I) k Ψ′P(I) k I.
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Proof. By Corollary 3.26 and by Lemma A.5, sP(I) = If ⊗ I and I =
ΦP(I). From Lemma A.4, sP(I) k Ψ′P(I). By definition of Ψ
′
P , Ψ
′
P(I) =
lfpt(λx.ΨP (x, I)). But, I = ΦP(I) = ΨP(I, I), thus Ψ
′
P(I) t I.
Now we show by induction on i, that F Ii t v
I
i . Therefore, at the limit,
sP(I) t Ψ′P(I) and, thus, sP(I) t Ψ
′
P(I) t I hold.
(i) Case i = 0. F I0 = If t If = v
I
0 .
(ii) Induction step: let us assume that F Ii t v
I
i holds. From Lemma A.3,
we have F Ii t I and, thus, by Lemma 2.3, F
I
i t F
I
i ⊕ I t I follows. We also
have I k F Ii ⊕ I and F
I
i k F
I
i ⊕ I. Then, from Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2,
F Ii+1 = If⊗ΨP(F
I
i ⊕I, F
I
i ⊕I) = If⊗ΨP(F
I
i , I). By induction F
I
i t v
I
i , so by
Lemma 2.4 we have F Ii+1 = If ⊗ΨP(F
I
i , I) t ΨP(F
I
i , I) t ΨP(v
I
i , I) = v
I
i+1,
which concludes.
Finally, from sP(I) t Ψ′P(I) t I and by Lemma 2.2 we have Ψ
′
P(I) k
I ⊕ sP(I) = I, so sP(I) k Ψ′P(I) k I.
Now we are ready to show that fixed-points of Φ′P are stable models.
Theorem A.7 Every fixed-point of Φ′P is a stable model of P.
Proof. Assume I = Φ′P(I). Let us show that I = Ψ
′
P(I). From Lemma A.6, we
know that Ψ′P(I) k I. Now, let us show by induction on i that J
I
i k Ψ
′
P(I).
Therefore, at the limit I = Φ′P(I) k Ψ
′
P(I) and, thus, I = Ψ
′
P(I).
(i) Case i = 0. JI0 = sP(I) k Ψ
′
P(I), by Lemma A.6.
(ii) Induction step: let us assume that JIi k Ψ
′
P(I) holds. By definition,
JIi+1 = ΦP(J
I
i ) ⊕ J
I
i . By induction J
I
i k Ψ
′
P(I). Therefore, J
I
i+1 k
ΦP(Ψ
′
P(I)) ⊕ Ψ
′
P(I). But, by Lemma A.6, Ψ
′
P(I) k I, so ΦP(Ψ
′
P(I)) =
ΨP(Ψ
′
P(I), Ψ
′
P(I)) k ΨP(Ψ
′
P(I), I) = Ψ
′
P(I). Therefore, J
I
i+1 k Ψ
′
P(I).
The following lemmas are needed to show the converse, i.e. that stable models
are fixed-points of Φ′P .
Lemma A.8 If I = Ψ′P(I) then we have:
1. sP(I) k I;
2. Φ′P(I) k I;
3. Φ′P(I) t I.
Proof. Assume I = Ψ′P(I). By Theorem 2.20, I = ΦP(I). By Lemma A.4,
sP(I) k Ψ
′
P(I) = I, which completes Point 1..
Now, we show by induction on i that, JIi k I and J
I
i t I and, thus, at
the limit Φ′P(I) k I and Φ
′
P(I) t I hold.
(i) Case i = 0. By Point 1., JI0 = sP(I) k I, while J
I
0 = sP(I) t I, by
Lemma A.3.
(ii) Induction step: let us assume that JIi k I and J
I
i t I hold. By
definition, JIi+1 = ΦP(J
I
i )⊕J
I
i . By induction J
I
i k I, thus J
I
i+1 k ΦP(I)⊕I =
I ⊕ I = I, which completes Point 2. From JIi k I, ΦP(J
I
i ) k ΦP(I) = I
follows. By induction we have JIi t I, thus J
I
i+1 t ΦP(J
I
i ) ⊕ I = I, which
completes Point 3.
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Lemma A.9 If I = Ψ′P(I) then I t Φ
′
P(I).
Proof. Assume I = Ψ′P(I). By Theorem 2.20, I = ΦP(I). By Lemma A.3 and
Lemma A.8, sP(I) k I and sP(I) t I, so by Lemma 2.7, sP(I) = sP(I)⊗If =
I ⊗ If.
Now, we show by induction on i, that vIi t Φ
′
P(I). Therefore, at the limit,
I = Ψ′P(I) t Φ
′
P(I).
(i) Case i = 0. vI0 = If t Φ
′
P(I).
(ii) Induction step: let us assume that vIi t Φ
′
P(I) holds. By definition
and by the induction hypothesis, vIi+1 = ΨP(v
I
i , I) t ΨP(Φ
′
P (I), I). By
Lemma A.8, Φ′P(I) t I. Therefore, since ΨP is antitone in the second ar-
gument under t, vIi+1 t ΨP(Φ
′
P(I),Φ
′
P (I)) = ΦP(Φ
′
P(I)). It follows that
vIi ⊕ v
I
i+1 t ΦP(Φ
′
P(I)) ⊕ Φ
′
P(I) = Φ
′
P(I). By Lemma 2.5, (by assuming,
x = vIi , z = v
I
i+1, y = Φ
′
P(I)), v
I
i+1 k Φ
′
P(I)⊕If follows. By Lemma A.8, both
Φ′P(I) t I and Φ
′
P(I) k I hold. Therefore, by Lemma 2.7, Φ
′
P(I) ⊗ If =
I⊗If = sP(I). From Lemma A.4, Φ
′
P(I)⊗If = sP(I) k v
I
i+1 k Φ
′
P(I)⊕If.
Therefore, by Lemma 2.6, it follows that vIi+1 t Φ
′
P(I), which concludes the
proof.
We can now prove that every stable model is indeed a fixed-point of Φ′P , which
concludes the characterization of stable models on bilattices.
Theorem A.10 Every stable model of P is a fixed-point of Φ′P .
l Proof. Assume I = Ψ′P(I). By Lemma A.8, Φ
′
P(I) t I, while by Lemma A.9,
I t Φ′P(I). So I = Φ
′
P(I).
Finally, Theorem 3.27 flollows directly from Theorems A.7, A.10, 3.20 and Corol-
lary 3.26.
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